Difference between revisions of "Offense - Adversarial Threats/Attacks"

From
Jump to: navigation, search
(References)
m
 
(50 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
[http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Adversarial+threat+attack+Deep+Learning+Artificial+Intelligence Youtube search...]
+
{{#seo:
 +
|title=PRIMO.ai
 +
|titlemode=append
 +
|keywords=ChatGPT, artificial, intelligence, machine, learning, GPT-4, GPT-5, NLP, NLG, NLC, NLU, models, data, singularity, moonshot, Sentience, AGI, Emergence, Moonshot, Explainable, TensorFlow, Google, Nvidia, Microsoft, Azure, Amazon, AWS, Hugging Face, OpenAI, Tensorflow, OpenAI, Google, Nvidia, Microsoft, Azure, Amazon, AWS, Meta, LLM, metaverse, assistants, agents, digital twin, IoT, Transhumanism, Immersive Reality, Generative AI, Conversational AI, Perplexity, Bing, You, Bard, Ernie, prompt Engineering LangChain, Video/Image, Vision, End-to-End Speech, Synthesize Speech, Speech Recognition, Stanford, MIT |description=Helpful resources for your journey with artificial intelligence; videos, articles, techniques, courses, profiles, and tools 
  
* [[Cybersecurity]]
+
<!-- Google tag (gtag.js) -->
* [[Defense - Anomaly Detection]]
+
<script async src="https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=G-4GCWLBVJ7T"></script>
* [[Capabilities]]  
+
<script>
 +
  window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || [];
 +
  function gtag(){dataLayer.push(arguments);}
 +
  gtag('js', new Date());
 +
 
 +
  gtag('config', 'G-4GCWLBVJ7T');
 +
</script>
 +
}}
 +
[https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Adversarial+threat+attack+defcon+Deep+Learning+Artificial+Intelligence Youtube search...]
 +
[https://www.google.com/search?q=adversarial+threat+attack+defcon+deep+machine+learning+ML+artificial+intelligence ...Google search]
 +
 
 +
* [[Cybersecurity]] ... [[Open-Source Intelligence - OSINT |OSINT]] ... [[Cybersecurity Frameworks, Architectures & Roadmaps | Frameworks]] ... [[Cybersecurity References|References]] ... [[Offense - Adversarial Threats/Attacks| Offense]] ... [[National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)|NIST]] ... [[U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)| DHS]] ... [[Screening; Passenger, Luggage, & Cargo|Screening]] ... [[Law Enforcement]] ... [[Government Services|Government]] ... [[Defense]] ... [[Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)#Cybersecurity & Acquisition Lifecycle Integration| Lifecycle Integration]] ... [[Cybersecurity Companies/Products|Products]] ... [[Cybersecurity: Evaluating & Selling|Evaluating]]
 +
* [[Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) Problem/Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) Solvers]]
 +
* [[Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks]]
 
______________________________________________________
 
______________________________________________________
  
  
* [http://www.cleverhans.io/ Cleverhans] - library for benchmarking the vulnerability of machine learning models to adversarial examples blog
+
* [https://www.cleverhans.io/ Cleverhans] - library for benchmarking the vulnerability of machine learning models to adversarial examples blog
* [http://github.com/nababora/advML Adversarial Machine Learning for Anti-Malware Software | nababora @ GitHub]
+
* [https://github.com/nababora/advML Adversarial Machine Learning for Anti-Malware Software | nababora @ GitHub]
* [http://github.com/cchio/deep-pwning Deep-pwning/Metasploit | Clarence Chio]
+
* [https://github.com/cchio/deep-pwning Deep-pwning/Metasploit | Clarence Chio]
* [http://evademl.org/ EvadeML.org | University of Virginia]
+
* [https://evademl.org/ EvadeML.org | University of Virginia]
* [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.04786.pdf AdversariaLib: An Open-source Library for the Security Evaluation of Machine Learning Algorithms Under Attack]
+
* [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.04786.pdf AdversariaLib: An Open-source Library for the Security Evaluation of Machine Learning Algorithms Under Attack]
* [http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en Pattern Recognition and Applications Lab (PRA Lab)]
+
* [https://pralab.diee.unica.it/en Pattern Recognition and Applications Lab (PRA Lab)]
** [http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/AdversariaLib AdversariaLib | PRA Lab]
+
** [https://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/AdversariaLib AdversariaLib | PRA Lab]
** [http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/ALFASVMLib adversarial label flip attacks against Support Vector Machines (ALFASVMLib) | PRA Lab]
+
** [https://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/ALFASVMLib Adversarial label flip attacks against Support Vector Machines (ALFASVMLib) | PRA Lab]
 +
* [https://www.marktechpost.com/2022/11/25/this-invisible-sweater-developed-by-the-university-of-maryland-tricks-artificial-intelligence-ai-cameras-and-stops-them-from-recognizing-people/ This Invisible Sweater Developed by the University of Maryland Tricks Artificial Intelligence (AI) Cameras and Stops them from Recognizing People | Ashish Kumar - MarketPost]
  
Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake; they’re like optical illusions for machines. Myth: An attacker must have access to the model to generate adversarial examples.  Fact: Adversarial examples generalize across models trained to perform the same task, even if those models have different architectures and were trained on a different training set. This means an attacker can train their own model, generate adversarial examples against it, and then deploy those adversarial examples against a model they do not have access to. -[http://www.kdnuggets.com/2015/07/deep-learning-adversarial-examples-misconceptions.html Deep Learning Adversarial Examples – Clarifying Misconceptions | Goodfellow et al. ]
+
Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake; they’re like optical illusions for machines. Myth: An attacker must have access to the model to generate adversarial examples.  Fact: Adversarial examples generalize across models trained to perform the same task, even if those models have different architectures and were trained on a different training set. This means an attacker can train their own model, generate adversarial examples against it, and then deploy those adversarial examples against a model they do not have access to. -[https://www.kdnuggets.com/2015/07/deep-learning-adversarial-examples-misconceptions.html Deep Learning Adversarial Examples – Clarifying Misconceptions | Goodfellow et al. ]
  
 +
 +
 +
<youtube>zLZR7lxl5bc</youtube>
 +
<youtube>wbRx18VZlYA</youtube>
 +
<youtube>JAGDpJFFM2A</youtube>
 +
<youtube>NrGMvTZxAwU</youtube>
 
<youtube>4rFOkpI0Lcg</youtube>
 
<youtube>4rFOkpI0Lcg</youtube>
<youtube>JAGDpJFFM2A</youtube>
 
 
<youtube>j9FLOinaG94</youtube>
 
<youtube>j9FLOinaG94</youtube>
 
<youtube>M2IebCN9Ht4</youtube>
 
<youtube>M2IebCN9Ht4</youtube>
Line 26: Line 48:
 
<youtube>sFhD6ABghf8</youtube>
 
<youtube>sFhD6ABghf8</youtube>
 
<youtube>dfgOar_jaG0</youtube>
 
<youtube>dfgOar_jaG0</youtube>
 +
<youtube>hmUPhRtS_pY</youtube>
 +
<youtube>cjo_u_yT2wQ</youtube>
 +
<youtube>KGKlAQ8tH5o</youtube>
  
== References ==
+
= Data Poisoning =
 
+
[https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Poisoning+Label+Flipping+Adversarial+threat+attack+defcon+Deep+Learning+Artificial+Intelligence Youtube search...]
Abadi, M. Chu , A. Goodfellow, I. McMahan, H. Mironov, I. Talwar, K. and Zhang, L. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.00133.pdf Deep Learning with Differential Privacy], 24 Oct 2016
+
[https://www.google.com/search?q=Poisoning+Label+Flippingadversarial+threat+attack+defcon+deep+machine+learning+ML+artificial+intelligence ...Google search]
 
 
Abhijith [http://abhijith.live/introduction-to-artificial-intelligence-for-security-professionals-book/ Introduction to Artificial intelligence for security professionals], 12 Aug 2017
 
 
 
Abramson, Myriam [http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b2f7/69ddcf8cae594f39e839aa29b27b98f403ca.pdf Toward Adversarial Online Learning and the Science of Deceptive Machines], 13 Sep 2017
 
 
 
Akhtar et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.00553.pdf Threat of Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning in Computer Vision: A Survey], 26 Feb 2018
 
 
 
Al-Dujaili et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.02950.pdf Adversarial Deep Learning for Robust Detection of Binary Encoded Malware], 25 Mar 2018
 
 
 
Amodei, D. and Olah, C. et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.06565.pdf Concrete Problems in AI Safety], 25 Jul 2016
 
 
 
Anderson, H.S., Kharkar, A., Filar, B., Evans, D., and Roth, P. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.08917.pdf Learning to Evade Static PE Machine Learning Malware Models via Reinforcement Learning], 26 Jan 2018
 
 
 
Anderson, H., Woodbridge, J., and Filar, B. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.01969.pdf DeepDGA: Adversarially-Tuned Domain Generation and Detection], 6 Oct 2016
 
 
 
Arulkumaran, K., Deisenroth, M., Brundage, M., and Bharath, A. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.05866.pdf A Brief Survey of Deep Reinforcement Learning], 28 Sep 2017
 
 
 
Barreno et al. [http://bnrg.cs.berkeley.edu/~adj/publications/paper-files/asiaccs06.pdf Can Machine Learning Be Secure?], 21 Mar 2016
 
 
 
Bastani, O., Kim, C., Bastani [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.08504.pdf Interpreting Blackbox Models via Model Extraction], 22 May 2018
 
  
Biggio, B., Nelson, B., and P. Laskov [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1206.6389.pdf Poisoning Attacks against Support Vector Machines], 25 Mar 2013
+
* [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.01982.pdf Defending against the Label-flipping Attack in Federated Learning | Najeeb Moharram Jebreel, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, David Sánchez and Alberto Blanco-Justicia]
  
Biggio et al. [http://proceedings.mlr.press/v20/biggio11/biggio11.pdf Support Vector Machines Under Adversarial Label Noise], 2011
+
Data poisoning or model poisoning attacks involve polluting a machine learning model's training data. Data poisoning is considered an integrity attack because tampering with the training data impacts the model's ability to output correct predictions. Other types of attacks can be similarly classified based on their impact:
  
Brundage et al. [http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1802/1802.07228.pdf The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation], Feb 2018
+
* Confidentiality, where the attackers can infer potentially confidential information about the training data by feeding inputs to the model
 +
* Availability, where the attackers disguise their inputs to trick the model in order to evade correct classification
 +
* Replication, where attackers can reverse-engineer the model in order to replicate it and analyze it locally to prepare attacks or exploit it for their own financial gain
 +
The difference between an attack that is meant to evade a model's prediction or classification and a poisoning attack is persistence: with poisoning, the attacker's goal is to get their inputs to be accepted as training data. The length of the attack also differs because it depends on the model's training cycle; it might take weeks for the attacker to achieve their poisoning goal.
  
Bulo et al. [http://pralab.diee.unica.it/sites/default/files/bulo16-tnnls.pdf Randomized Prediction Games for Adversarial Machine Learning], 11 Nov 2017
+
Data poisoning can be achieved either in a blackbox scenario against classifiers that rely on user feedback to update their learning or in a whitebox scenario where the attacker gains access to the model and its private training data, possibly somewhere in the supply chain if the training data is collected from multiple sources.  [How data poisoning attacks corrupt machine learning models. [https://www.csoonline.com/article/3613932/how-data-poisoning-attacks-corrupt-machine-learning-models.html How data poisoning attacks corrupt machine learning models | Lucian Constantin - CSO]
  
Carbon Black [http://www.carbonblack.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Carbon_Black_Research_Report_NonMalwareAttacks_ArtificialIntelligence_MachineLearning_BeyondtheHype.pdf Beyond the Hype: Security Experts
 
Weigh in on Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Non-Malware Attacks], 2017
 
  
Carlini et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.01944.pdfAudio Adversarial Examples: Targeted Attacks on Speech-to-Text], 5 Jan 2018
+
<youtube>OB54mKmUjmI</youtube>
 +
<youtube>WO3zRP9c4p0</youtube>
 +
<youtube>ujL8j4QS0rA</youtube>
 +
<youtube>ZZky3uf-9IM</youtube>
  
Chen et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.04146.pdf Automated Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in Malware Detection Systems: An Adversarial Machine Learning Approach], 31 Oct 2017
 
  
Chen et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.04114.pdf EAD. Elastic-Net Attacks to Deep Neural Networks via Adversarial Examples], 10 Feb 2018
+
= <span id="Side Channel Attack (SCA)"></span>Side Channel Attack (SCA) =
 +
* [[Quantum#Cryptography | Quantum Cryptography]]
 +
* [[Cybersecurity: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) & U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)#Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) | Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)]]
 +
* [https://github.com/PRASANNA-RAVI/SCA_protected_Kyber Side-Channel Attack protected Implementation of Kyber, a Lattice-based KEM scheme which is part of the NIST standardization | Prasanna-Ravi] ... employing a cheap and low-entropy masking which involves multiplicative masking with powers of the twiddle factors whose products are already pre-computed.
 +
* [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3517810 A Review and Comparison of AI-enhanced Side Channel Analysis | M. Panoff, H. Yu, H. Shan, & Y. Jin - Association of COmputing Machinery (ACM)]
 +
* [https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/1213/2/022013/pdf Overview of Side Channel Cipher Analysis Basedon Deep Learning | S. Song, K. Chen1and, &  Y. Zhang - Institute of Physics]
 +
* [https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/527.pdf PQC-SEP: Power Side-channel Evaluation Platform for Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithms | J. Park, N. Anandakumar, D. Saha, D. Mehta, N. Pundir, F. Rahman, F. Farahmandi, & M. Tehranipoor - University of Florida]
 +
* [https://diglib.tugraz.at/download.php?id=5d7ac539b31eb&location=browse Side-Channel Attacks on Lattice-Based Cryptography and Multi-Processor Systems | Peter Peß]
 +
* [https://www.design-reuse.com/industryexpertblogs/53785/mitigating-side-channel-attacks-in-post-quantum-cryptography-pqc.html Mitigating Side-Channel Attacks In Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) With Secure-IC Solutions | Secure-IC]
 +
* [https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hackers-can-steal-from-reflections/ How Hackers Can Steal Secrets from Reflections | W. Wayt Gibbs  - Scientific American] ... Information thieves can now go around encryption, networks and the operating system
  
Chen et al. [http://www.researchgate.net/publication/317576889_Hardening_Malware_Detection_Systems_Against_Cyber_Maneuvers_An_Adversarial_Machine_Learning_Approach Hardening Malware Detection Systems Against Cyber Maneuvers. An Adversarial Machine Learning Approach], 13 Oct 2017
 
  
Chen et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05526.pdf Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoning], 15 Dec 2017
+
In computer security, a side-channel attack is any attack based on extra information that can be gathered because of the fundamental way a computer protocol or algorithm is implemented, rather than flaws in the design of the protocol or algorithm itself (e.g. flaws found in a cryptanalysis of a cryptographic algorithm) or minor, but potentially devastating, mistakes or oversights in the implementation. (Cryptanalysis also includes searching for side-channel attacks.) Timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, and sound are examples of extra information which could be exploited to facilitate side-channel attacks. - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side-channel_attack Wikipedia]
  
Demontis et al. [http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1816/paper-11.pdf Infinity-Norm Support Vector Machines Against Adversarial Label Contamination], 2017
 
  
Evtimov, I., Eykholt, K., Fernandes, E., Kohno, T., Li, B., Prakash, A., Rahmati, A., and Song, D. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08945.pdf Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification], 2017
+
<youtube>8Cb-YefLyhM</youtube>
 
+
<youtube>rb1wzJeGbD8</youtube>
Goodfellow et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.02533.pdf Adversarial examples in the physical world], 11 Feb 2017
 
 
 
Goodfellow et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.08195.pdf Adversarial Examples that Fool both Human and Computer Vision], 22 May 2018
 
 
 
Goodfellow et al. [http://blog.openai.com/adversarial-example-research/ Attacking Machine Learning with Adversarial Examples], 24 Feb 2017
 
 
 
Goodfellow et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.6572.pdf Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples], 20 Mar 2015
 
 
 
Goodfellow et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.6199.pdf Intriguing properties of neural networks], 19 Feb 2014
 
 
 
Goodfellow et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.03453.pdf The Space of Transferable Adversarial Examples], 23 May 2017
 
 
 
Goodfellow et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.07277.pdf Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samples], 24 May 2016
 
 
 
Grosse et al. [http://www.patrickmcdaniel.org/pubs/esorics17.pdf Adversarial Examples for Malware Detection], 12 Aug 2017
 
 
 
Grosse et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.04435.pdf Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural Networks for Malware Classification], 16 Jun 2016
 
 
 
Hosseini et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.04318.pdf Blocking Transferability of Adversarial Examples in Black-Box Learning Systems], 13 Mar 2017
 
 
 
Hu et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.05983.pdf Generating Adversarial Malware Examples for Black-Box Attacks Based on GAN], 20 Feb 2017
 
 
 
Huang et al. [http://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/SML2/Adversarial_AISEC.pdf Adversarial Machine Learning], Oct 2011
 
 
 
Jin et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.06306.pdf Robust Convolutional Neural Networks under Adversarial Noise], 25 Feb 2016
 
 
 
Kantarcioglu et al. [http://www.utdallas.edu/~muratk/CCS-tutorial.pdf Adversarial Data Mining for Cyber Security], 28 Oct 2016
 
 
 
Kantchelian et al. [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1509.07892.pdf Evasion and Hardening of Tree Ensemble Classifiers], 27 May 2016
 
 
 
Kantchelian [http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4a8d/97172382144b9906e2cec69d3decb4188fb7.pdf Taming Evasions in Machine Learning Based Detection], 12 Aug 2016
 
 
 
Keshet et al. [http://www.groundai.com/project/adversarial-examples-on-discrete-sequences-for-beating-whole-binary-malware-detection/ Adversarial Examples on Discrete Sequences for Beating Whole-Binary Malware Detection], 13 Feb 2018
 
 
 
Kolosnjaji et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.04173.pdf Adversarial Malware Binaries: Evading Deep Learning for Malware Detection in Executables], 12 Mar 2018
 
 
 
Kreuk et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.04528.pdf Deceiving End-to-End Deep Learning Malware Detectors using Adversarial Examples], 13 May 2018
 
 
 
Laskov et al. [http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.375.4564&rep=rep1&type=pdf Machine Learning in Adversarial Environments], 28 Jun 2010
 
 
 
Luo et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04693.pdf Towards Imperceptible and Robust Adversarial Example Attacks against Neural], 15 Jan 2018
 
 
 
Madry et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06083.pdf Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks], 19 Jun 2017
 
 
 
Miller et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.09823.pdf Adversarial Learning. A Critical Review and Active Learning Study], 27 May 2017
 
 
 
Muñoz-González et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.08689.pdf Towards Poisoning of Deep Learning Algorithms with Back-gradient Optimization], 29 Aug 2017
 
 
 
Naveiro et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07513.pdf Adversarial classification: An adversarial risk analysis approach], 21 Feb 2018
 
 
 
Nguyen et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.1897.pdf Deep Neural Networks are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images], 2 Apr 2015
 
 
 
Norton et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.00807.pdf Adversarial-Playground: A Visualization Suite Showing How Adversarial Examples Fool Deep Learning], 1 Aug 2017
 
 
 
Ororbia II et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1601.07213.pdf Unifying Adversarial Training Algorithms with Flexible Deep Data Gradient Regularization], 29 Jul 2016
 
 
 
Papernot et al. [http://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/conference/protected-files/enigma17_slides_papernot.pdf  Adversarial Examples in Machine Learning], 1 Feb 2017
 
 
 
Papernot et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.04435.pdf Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural Networks], 16 Jun 2016
 
 
 
Papernot et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.04508.pdf Distillation as a Defense to Adversarial Perturbations against Deep Neural Networks], 14 Nov 2015
 
 
 
Papernot et al. [http://arxiv.org/abs/1511.07528 The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings], 24 Nov 2015
 
 
 
Papernot et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.06280.pdf On the (Statistical) Detection of Adversarial Examples], 21 Feb 2017
 
 
 
Papernot et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.02697.pdf Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning], 8 Feb 2016
 
 
 
Paudice et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.03041.pdf Detection of Adversarial Training Examples in Poisoning Attacks through Anomaly Detection], 8 Feb 2018
 
 
 
Raghunathan et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.09344.pdf Certified Defenses against Adversarial Examples], 29 Jan 2018
 
 
 
Rouhani et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.02538.pdf CuRTAIL: ChaRacterizing and Thwarting AdversarIal deep Learning], 1 Apr 2018
 
 
 
Shen et al. [http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~shruti90/papers/auror.pdf AUROR: Defending Against Poisoning Attacks in Collaborative Deep Learning Systems], 5 Dec 2016
 
 
 
Stokes et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05919.pdf Attack and Defense of Dynamic Analysis-Based, Adversarial Neural Malware Classification Models] 16 Dec 2017
 
 
 
Uesato et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.05666.pdf Adversarial Risk and the Dangers of Evaluating Against Weak Attacks], 12 Jun 2018
 
 
 
Uther et al.[http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mmv/papers/03TR-advRL.pdf Adversarial Reinforcement Learning], Jan 2003
 
 
 
Wang et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.01239.pdf Adversary Resistant Deep Neural Networks with an Application to Malware Detection], 27 Apr 2017
 
 
 
Xiao et al. [http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6adb/6154e091e6448d63327eadb6159746a2710d.pdf Adversarial and Secure Machine Learning], 27 Oct 2016
 
 
 
Xu et al. [http://evademl.org/docs/evademl.pdf Automatically Evading Classifiers: A Case Study on PDF Malware Classifiers], Feb 2016
 
 
 
Xu et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.01155.pdf Feature Squeezing; Detecting Adversarial Examples in Deep Neural Networks], 5 Dec 2017
 
 
 
Yuan et al. [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.07107.pdf Adversarial Examples. Attacks and Defenses for Deep Learning], 5 2018]
 
 
 
== Weaponizing Machine Learning ==
 
[http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=~weaponizing+Deep+Learning+Artificial+Intelligence Youtube search...]
 
 
 
<youtube>wbRx18VZlYA</youtube>
 

Latest revision as of 20:33, 7 July 2023

Youtube search... ...Google search

______________________________________________________


Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake; they’re like optical illusions for machines. Myth: An attacker must have access to the model to generate adversarial examples. Fact: Adversarial examples generalize across models trained to perform the same task, even if those models have different architectures and were trained on a different training set. This means an attacker can train their own model, generate adversarial examples against it, and then deploy those adversarial examples against a model they do not have access to. -Deep Learning Adversarial Examples – Clarifying Misconceptions | Goodfellow et al.


Data Poisoning

Youtube search... ...Google search

Data poisoning or model poisoning attacks involve polluting a machine learning model's training data. Data poisoning is considered an integrity attack because tampering with the training data impacts the model's ability to output correct predictions. Other types of attacks can be similarly classified based on their impact:

  • Confidentiality, where the attackers can infer potentially confidential information about the training data by feeding inputs to the model
  • Availability, where the attackers disguise their inputs to trick the model in order to evade correct classification
  • Replication, where attackers can reverse-engineer the model in order to replicate it and analyze it locally to prepare attacks or exploit it for their own financial gain

The difference between an attack that is meant to evade a model's prediction or classification and a poisoning attack is persistence: with poisoning, the attacker's goal is to get their inputs to be accepted as training data. The length of the attack also differs because it depends on the model's training cycle; it might take weeks for the attacker to achieve their poisoning goal.

Data poisoning can be achieved either in a blackbox scenario against classifiers that rely on user feedback to update their learning or in a whitebox scenario where the attacker gains access to the model and its private training data, possibly somewhere in the supply chain if the training data is collected from multiple sources. [How data poisoning attacks corrupt machine learning models. How data poisoning attacks corrupt machine learning models | Lucian Constantin - CSO



Side Channel Attack (SCA)


In computer security, a side-channel attack is any attack based on extra information that can be gathered because of the fundamental way a computer protocol or algorithm is implemented, rather than flaws in the design of the protocol or algorithm itself (e.g. flaws found in a cryptanalysis of a cryptographic algorithm) or minor, but potentially devastating, mistakes or oversights in the implementation. (Cryptanalysis also includes searching for side-channel attacks.) Timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, and sound are examples of extra information which could be exploited to facilitate side-channel attacks. - Wikipedia